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The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of methodological transfers from behav-
ioral ecology to experimental economics with respect to the elicitation of intertemporal
preferences. More precisely our discussion will stem from the analysis of Stephens and
Anderson’s (2001) seminal article. In their study with blue jays they document that forag-
ing behavior typically implements short-sighted choice rules which are beneficial in the
long run. Such long-term profitability of short-sighted behavior cannot be evidenced when
using a self-control paradigm (one which contrasts in a binary way sooner smaller and later
larger payoffs) but becomes apparent when ecological patch-paradigms (replicating eco-
nomic situations in which the main trade-off consists in staying on a food patch or leaving
for another patch) are implemented. We transfer this methodology in view of contrasting
foraging strategies and self-control in human intertemporal choices.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of methodolog-
ical transfers from behavioral ecology to the neuroeconomics of
intertemporal choices. More precisely, our discussion stems from
the analysis of Stephens and Anderson’s (2001) seminal article.
In their study with blue jays they report that foraging behavior
typically implements short-sighted choice rules which are benefi-
cial in the long run. Such long-term profitability of short-sighted
behavior cannot be evidenced when using a self-control para-
digm (one which contrasts in a binary way sooner smaller and
later larger payoffs) but becomes apparent when ecological patch-
paradigms (replicating economic situations in which the main
trade-off consists in staying on a food patch or leaving for another
patch) are implemented [see Figure 1]. Stephens and Anderson
show that in certain situations (self-control settings) the imme-
diate consequences of choice strongly influence animal behav-
ior, while in other situations (stylized patch situations) animals
adopt strategies apparently consistent with evolutionary models
that emphasize the long-term fitness consequences of individual
choices.
We schematize the two types of experimental paradigms
and then address our target question as to know to what
extent it is theoretically relevant to generalize them to issues
recently addressed in the neuroeconomics of intertemporal
choices. We defend a dual system underlying intertempo-
ral choices, which is, however, distinct from McClure et al’s.
(2004) view of a limbic system and a prefrontal system respec-
tively encoding impatient and patient intertemporal choices.
We rather focus on the contextual dependence/relevance of
each of the two systems involved in that type of choices pleas
in favor of the plausibility of optimal short-sighted behav-
ior. This line of argument is briefly related to evolutionary
considerations.
PATCHES AND SELF-CONTROL PARADIGMS IN
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE ELICITATION
ANIMAL SELF-CONTROL
Evolutionary theory predicts preferences for long-term decisions,
if the issue is to guarantee the replication of a subset of genes
making up an individual organism over a given temporal delay
(until decay). Self-control paradigms are supposed to elicit those
preferences at the individual level. In these settings animal have
to wait for a time (T ) and then have to make a binary choice
between (1) a small-immediate reward (t 1→G1→ p) and a (2)
large-delayed choice (t 2→G2; with t 2> t 1 and G2>G1), with a
post-feeding delay (p) for one or both conditions. “Self-control” is
defined as the case in which the subject waits for the large-delayed
reward.
The long-term rate model predicts that in a self-control sit-
uation animals should choose the alternative 1 when the ratio
of the first gain amount (G1) and the sum of the initial time
(T ), of the short delay (t 1) and the post-feeding delay (p) is
greater than the ratio of the second gain amount (G2) and the
sum of the initial time (T ) and the longer delay (t 2), that is to
say: G1/T + t 1+ p>G2/T + t 2. Long-sighted decisions involve
temporal elements that play an important role in determining
preferences but, as experimental evidence shows, animals treat
these temporal elements in different ways:
• Delays between choice and food delivery strongly influence for-
aging preferences; in fact animals prefer shorter-delay even if the
delayed amount is double (in some settings wherein self-control
is particularly hard to maintain, among non-human animals only
rhesus macaques seem to succeed; see Evans and Beran, 2007).
• Post-feeding delay yields virtually no effect on animal prefer-
ences, which discords with far-sighted models (Stephens et al.,
2004).
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FIGURE 1 | Patch vs. binary-choice paradigms.
• Inter-trial intervals (ITIs) make little effect on preferences,which
again disagrees with far-sighted models (as shown, for instance,
in Schultz, 2010).
As we can see self-control results contradict evolutionary models
assuming long-term calculations. An obvious limitation of these
models is their ability to accommodate small discounting effects,
but their lack of account for long-term effects of systematic itera-
tive short-sighted decisions. However, the potential optimality of
iterative myopic behavior in the long run can be elicited by using
the alternative patch-paradigm.
PATCHES
In the patch-paradigm approach we define a“patch residence time”
as the foraging duration spent by an animal on a particular area
before it moves to another due to its observation or anticipa-
tion of local resources decrease (Stephens and Anderson, 2001).
This approach relies on the prediction that patch residence times
have an incidence on the long-term rate of food intake (Stephens
and Krebs, 1986) and that foragers should spend more time in
patches when travel times to a patch to another are longer. In fact
travel time plays a role similar to the ITI but, contrary to what
we observed with the self-control approach, in patch situations its
effect is crucial. To the extent that foragers can choose between
a small amount of food reachable in a short time and a large
amount of food reachable in a longer time located on another
patch, patch-paradigms implement a critical travel time cost. The
contrast between staying on a patch and leaving that patch is this
time expressed by a two-argument function that includes time
and gain.
In spite of evidence to the effect that far-sighted foragers are
sensitive to ITI, a question remains unaddressed: why in patch
experiments long travel temporal intervals tends to induce animals
to spend longer time to extract more food, while in self-control
experiments ITI appears to have little effect? This question, as
well as the apparent evidence that animals always adopt myopic
strategies, has been tackled in an experiment where self-control
and patch situations are parameterized as economically equiva-
lent. In this experiment animals are trained to make as before (1) a
binary choice between a small-immediate and a large-delayed gain
(self-control), or (2) a choice between “leave” (small-immediate)
and “stay” (large-delayed; patch-paradigm). The two situations
are economically equivalent in so far as they present both the
same conditions in terms of time and rewards (the same time/gain
function as before). Since in this experiment the two situations are
economically equivalent, if it is true that animals always adopt
short-term strategies, the latter should be observable in both
self-control and patch situations.
In order to establish the different patterns of choices in the self-
control and patch-use contexts and because they had observed that
ITI has an effect only in patch experiments, the authors tested each
context at three distinct ITIs. To describe the differences in each
combination (self-control/patch and ITI) they measured the effect
for both 50 s and 5 s levels of delay-to-small reward. Results of the
experiment demonstrated that when the delay-to-small reward
(below abbreviated as DTS) was large (50 s) preferences of the
blue jays were not affected by the ITI. However, when the delay-
to-small was brief (5 s), the outcome was less tractable. In the
control situation, the jays’ preference for large rewards decreased
together with the ITI, while in the patch-use condition the sub-
jects’ preference increased for the large reward together with the
ITI. As predicted by evolutionary hypotheses about long-term fit-
ness maximization patch-use situations revealed that jays favor
large-delayed outcomes as ITI increased, but let us remind that in
self-control cases, the conclusion was precisely the opposite.
To sum up, results show that:
• If DTS= 50 s then ITI has no effect on preference, but animals
prefer large in the patch context.
• If DTS= 5 s then preferences for large increased with ITI in
patch, while decreased in self-control. This shows an interaction
between ITI and context in DTS.
The hypothesis proposed to explain these different behavioral
patterns is that a single short-sighted behavioral rule underlies
the approach to the different environments and their economic
parameters. Self-control situations involving binary choices trig-
ger a short-term rule that can be expressed simply as: “Choose
2 if G2/t 2>G1/t 1.” This rule evidently disagrees with long-
term maximization and ignores the potential impact of ITI
in self-control contexts. However, the very same rule when
applied in patch contexts may yield an optimal outcome, given
that is these contexts the rule can be expressed as: “Choose 2
if [(G2−G1)/(t 2− t 1)]− [G1/(T + t 1)]> 0.” The difference in
terms of long run optimality of the rules across the two experi-
mental paradigms can be easily explained if we pay attention to
the fact that the difference in short-term rates is equivalent to
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the difference in long-term rates because in the patch context the
short-term rule predicts sensitivity to T, the ITI term that con-
stitute part of the key delay. Based on this result, it is possible to
conclude that the short-term rule not only agrees, but significantly
determines the difference in long-term rates, that is to say that the
short-term rule explains the long-term maximization in the patch
contrary to self-control situation.
OPTIMAL FORAGING STRATEGIES VS. APPARENT LACK OF
SELF-CONTROL IN HUMAN INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE
Discounted utility theory (DUT) is the normative model used in
order to account for intertemporal decisions. This model intends
to capture the rationality of preferences over variably temporally
located options under the joint criteria that those preferences are
logically coherent, consistent over time and yield optimal pay-
offs. However, DUT has a restricted descriptive validity because it
fails to capture more or less systematic violations of preferences
temporal consistency. As neatly put by Kalenscher and Pennartz
(2008): “Common difference and immediacy effects and the fact
that preference reversals occur after deferring all choice alterna-
tives into the future by the same interval, violate assumptions of
consistent choice.” Foraging animals’ preferences might not essen-
tially depend on the proportion of rewards and delays presented
by alternative options but rather on the waiting time prior to the
gains. The comparison of results for similar economic parameters
over the two experimental paradigms demonstrates their incom-
patibility with an interpretation of foraging behavior in terms of
sacrifice rather than maximization. It is not necessary to discard a
short gain in order to maximize one’s fitness in the long run and
short-term benefits may add up to optimal payoffs.
Let us note that these results in behavioral ecology are consis-
tent with findings from McClure et al. (2004) study in which they
observed that neural activities of the limbic system were greater
for decisions involving choices between immediate and delayed
rewards than for choices between only delayed rewards. Some spe-
cific neural mechanism is involved when short terms options are
available. Yielding to immediate small rewards may be evolution-
arily advantageous because once a small reward is consumed, it
gets out of sight and temptation and the subject can pursue its
longer-term goals. If gains are easy to grab, with very low opportu-
nity costs, their immediate consumption may enhance the pursuit
of life strategies by smothering tingling appetites. Our foraging
ancestors may have developed this sense of taking advantages
of small rewards as they presented themselves in their environ-
ments. Neural mechanisms dedicated to the valuation of those
immediate rewards may thus have developed in order to deal
properly with scarce and random resources. In our contempo-
rary economic environments, this neural system may still prove
itself useful. However this intuitive and evidence-based dual sys-
tem approach defended by McClure and his colleagues is far from
unanimously received.
Kable and Glimcher (2007) have certainly stated one of the
most potent objections to the view that intertemporal choices are
supported by a dual system such as the one McClure describes.
More exactly, they contend that one general valuation system deals
with different characteristics of economic options. It is a com-
plex but single brain system that is, according to these authors,
involved in intertemporal choice, in the sense that they make clear
that the ventral striatum, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the
posterior cingulated cortex tracks the subjective value of mone-
tary rewards. Relative valuation, encoded by neural activities in
the different areas constituting this whole system, corresponds
to the selective manipulation of economic characteristics of the
rewards. Namely, activity in those three main regions increases as
the amount of the reward increases and decreases when the actual-
ization delay of that reward increases. Kable and Glimcher thereby
reduce intertemporal choice to option valuation according to dif-
ferent features processed single-handedly by one common neural
valuation system.
We argue in favor of a midway between these two opposite
neuroeconomic positions. The phenomenon of patience vs. impa-
tience is robust but the current analyses of how such contrasted
choices are encoded by the brain may miss the main point about
the nature of these choices. Kable and Glimcher (2007), to our
opinion, rightly point to the fact that as far as economic valua-
tion is concerned, one neural system, with internally differentiated
activities modulation, may be enough. The point is that economic
valuation is not the only parameter (notwithstanding its relative
complexity in terms of magnitude/delay trade-offs) at stake. Con-
textual evaluation in terms of probability of reward and richness
of environment, being part of a broadened ecological approach of
what intertemporal choices are like in natural and artificial eco-
nomic settings, are essential parts of the nature of intertemporal
choices and may motivate the adoption of a dual neural system
in order to account for the contrast between apparent patience
and impatience. But pace McClure et al. (2004) the dual system
in question is not best explained in terms of those insufficiently
contextualized behavioral denominations (patience/impatience)
but rather in terms of optimal short-sighted behavior vs. optimal
long-sighted behavior.
Kolling et al. (2012) have recently explored the neural mecha-
nisms of foraging with human subjects. They demonstrate that
humans can alternate between “stay” and “leave” strategies in
multi-branched patch settings such as the ones we have schema-
tized above. Humans process aptly the costs inherent to foraging
choices. The contrast between such choices involves neural struc-
tures that partly (but only partly) overlap with the valuation system
indicated by Kable and Glimcher (2007) and crosses over limbic
and prefrontal systems respectively associated in McClure et al.
(2004) to impatient and patient choices. “Stay or leave” choices
in foraging settings involve distinct neural mechanisms in ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex (VPMC) and anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC). VMPC activities are dedicated to a general valuation sys-
tem, like reported by Kable and Glimcher but the ACC encodes
the search cost and potential richness of alternative patching in
the environment, which is something sufficiently neurally specific
to this type of intertemporal choices setting. It seems to us then rel-
evant to assess the optimality of short-sightedness and long-term
choice behavior in terms of (i) the structure of economic set-
tings (i.e., whether they present foraging potentialities or binary
frames requiring self-control) and (ii) the correlation between the
economic structure (here in terms of richness and search cost)
and the contextual relevance of used behavioral rules within these
structures.
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CONCLUSION
Modern economic environments are labile and complex and the
propensity to accept small rewards may be optimal in the face of the
opportunity costs of more sophisticated strategies. It is also possi-
ble that the incorporation of long-term plans and self-projections
in the far future into present decisions is more evolutionary
recent than the tendency to accept immediate gratifications. From
that evolutionary perspective, the preference of small-immediate
rewards over larger future ones is not the sign of our irrationality,
but may rather reflect the conflict between two evolved ratio-
nal rules: the incremental pursuit of long-term goals and the
maximization of low cost immediate rewards. Patch-paradigms
used in behavioral ecology precisely demonstrate the compatibility
and optimal coincidence of these potentially jointly evolutionarily
selected behavioral rules. The apparent conflict shown by opposed
behavioral data over self-control and patch-paradigms is solved if
one considers, on the one hand, that aggregate immediate gains
may add up to maximizing long-term fitness and, on the other
hand, that predefined long-term goals are endogenously modified
by actually made choices.
Monterosso and Ainslie (1999) note that “people and less cog-
nitively sophisticated animals do not differ in the hyperbolic
form of their discount curves.” Some researchers (e.g., Herrn-
stein, 1997; Rachlin, 2000) hold the view that hyperbolic time
discounting is effectively “hardwired” into our evolutionary appa-
ratus. However, time discounting of humans and other animals
may also rely on qualitatively different mechanisms. While both
humans and animals discount the future at dramatically differ-
ent rates, both humans and animals display a common pattern
of time discounting commonly referred to as “hyperbolic time
discounting.” However, they believe that while such findings do
not rule out the possibility that humans and animals discount
the future similarly, the quantitative discontinuity is indicative
of a qualitative discontinuity. It is not that clear that discount-
ing of humans and other animals relies on qualitatively different
mechanisms even though, recent neuroeconomic studies (such
as McClure et al’s., 2004) tended to support that, specifically,
human time discounting reflects the operation of two funda-
mentally different systems, one that heavily values the present
and cares little about the future (which we share with other
animals), and another that discounts outcomes more consis-
tently across time (which is uniquely human). More extended
and systematic comparisons between foraging patches and self-
control paradigms among human subjects could help to revisit
this view.
Microeconomics research has seldom considered animals as
possible research subjects, but in recent years evolutionary the-
ories of human and animal decision making might show how
such a transfer of methodologies and theoretical goals could be
fruitful (Kalenscher and van Wingerden, 2011). Starting from evo-
lutionary considerations we can understand how the uncovering
of choice mechanisms in animals and their neural substrates may
help understand human intertemporal choice behavior. Moreover,
economic theories and ecological models show remarkable simi-
larities in their assumptions and implications (Stephens and Krebs,
1986). Although the decision rules used by modern humans take
place in a different context, they evolved in a similar context and
they may actually be maladaptive today to some extent (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1996). But it can also be envisioned that Stephens and
Anderson (2001) provide a useful tool to understand that modern
humans’ decision strategies are optimally adapted to the sequen-
tial foreground/background environment faced by foragers, but
at the same time they may fail to produce an optimal outcome in
a “modern” binary choice environments.
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